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Introduction

To the unsuspecting eye, Justice Anthony Kennedy's jurisprudential philosophy is a
riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma. 1 Indeed, even for many legal scholars, the only
point about Justice Kennedy's jurisprudential philosophy upon which they can be maddeningly
certain is that Justice Kennedy does not have a comprehensive jurisprudential philosophy. .The
general consensus on Kennedy is that he is a "legal pragmatist who goes case by case," without
"a consistent judicial philosophy to guide his decision making. " 2 3 More bluntly, "the more
closely one examines Kennedy's Supreme Court jurisprudence, the more confused one
becomes. " 4 During his Confirmation hearings, Kennedy himself admitted:
"I do not have an over-arching theory, a unitary theory of interpretation. I am
searching, as I think many judges are, for the correct balance in constitutional
interpretation. " 5
Despite his own admissions that he lacks a "unitary theory," a careful study of Kennedy's
jurisprudence reveals underlying interpretive themes. Kennedy's jurisprudential philosophy
centers on defining the moral content of the Constitution's "spacious clauses." 6 In particular,
judges must define and enforce the full and necessary meaning of "liberty," "consistent with the
Constitution as we understand it." 7 Liberty's moral content may be illuminated by history,

1

For quotation in its original context, see WINSTON CHURCHILL, The Russian Enigma (BBC radio address Oct. 1,
1939).
2
THOMAS HENSLEY, CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, AND JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE CHANGING SUPREME COURT:
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LffiERTIES {Minneapolis/St. Paul: Wadsworth, 1997), p. 75.
3
TINSLEY YARBOROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION {New York: Oxford University Press,
2000).
4
Patrick D. Schmidt and David A. Yalof, '"The Swing Voter' Revisited: Justice Anthony Kennedy and the First
Amendment Right of Free Speech," 57 Political Research Quarterly 209 (2004).
5
U.S. Senate, "Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States," 14-16 December 1987, p. 154.
6
FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY'S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND NECESSARY MEANING OF LffiERTY, 11
(2006).
7

Jd. at 9. See also U.S. Senate, supra, p. 86.
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tradition, original intent, and precedent, but its full and necessary meaning may extend beyond
these traditional sources. 8
This paper will begin by discussing Justice Kennedy's background and basic
jurisprudential philosophy. In Part III, I will discuss Kennedy's treatment of the Establishment
Clause, particularly in his formulation of a "coercion principle" to protect individual's belief and
exercise of religion from state interference. In Part IV, I will discuss Kennedy's views on
substantive Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment, wherein he protects private,
consensual intimate conduct of adults through liberty. In Party V, I will discuss Kennedy's
concept of cruel and unusual punishment, specifically in his prohibition on imposing capital
punishment on offenders who were under the age of 18 at the time of their offense. In Part VI, I
will discuss Kennedy's views on abortion, which shifted the constitutional foundations of the
right to choose to abort from privacy to liberty and allowed for greater State regulation. In Part
VII, I will discuss Kennedy's treatment of substantive Due Process under the Fifth Amendment,
as it applies to the equal recognition of same-sex marriage. Lastly, in Part VIII, I discuss
Kennedy's expansive conception of Free Speech, which he uses to protect political speech and
the right to dissent, to expand the "public forum doctrine," and to protect corporate political
expression.
Part 1: Background
A. The epitome of a Sacramento man
Anthony McLeod Kennedy ("Kennedy") was born on July 23, 1936 in Sacramento,
California to Anthony J. Kennedy and Gladys McLeod Kennedy. 9 Kennedy's father, Anthony

8

9

Jd. at 11 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003)).

THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY: ANTHONY KENNEDY, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/historyof-the-court/the-current-court/justice-anthony-kennedy/) (last visited November 30, 2013).
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°

"Bud" Kennedy ("Bud"), was a lawyer and lobbyist in the California legislature. 1 Kennedy's
mother was a teacher. 11 The Sacramento that Kennedy was born into was "a very reasonable
place" with "reasonable values." 12 As several laws passed in California in the 1920s had
weakened the established political parties, lobbyists "stepped into the vacuum to supply the
network the parties could not." 13 As a successful lobbyist, Bud Kennedy was "one of the men ...
who made Sacramento hum" and often conducted business with liquor industry, tobacco
industry, and manufacturing industry representatives over poker games in his backyard. 14
Young Kennedy was a parent's dream. Kennedy was an avid reader and an excellent,
albeit bored, student. 15 Kennedy grew up "super Catholic." 16 He attended Mass every Sunday
and was an altar boy at his local church. 17 Additionally, Kennedy was a wholesome youth whose
faultlessness bordered on the judgmental, as he was always quick to inform his comrades when
he believed they sinned. In the fourth grade, Bud arranged for his son to work as a page in the
California legislature, where he became acquainted with future Chief Justice Earl Warren. 18
Under Warren's wing, Kennedy learned intimate details of the legislative and democratic
process.
Kennedy graduated from McClatchy High School in 1954. 19 From there, Kennedy went
to study at Stanford University, his father and mother's alma mater. 20 Although he completed
his undergraduate requirements in three years, at the advice of his father, Kennedy took "a year
10

Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, What Will Justice Kennedy Do?, TIME MAGAZINE (Jun. 18, 2012),
http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0.33009.2116699.00.html.
11
See SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, supra.
12
See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, supra.
13 ld.
14 ld.
15 ld.
16 Id.
17 Jd.
18 Jd.
19

ANTHONY KENNEDY BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com/people/anthony-kennedy-9362868 (last visited
November 30, 2013).
20
See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, supra.
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off," in which he studied at the London School ofEconomics. 21 Kennedy graduated from
Stanford University in 1958 with a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science. 22 From Stanford,
Kennedy went straight to Harvard Law School, where he graduated cum laude in 1961. 23
After law school, Kennedy served for one year in the California National Guard before
settling in San Francisco to practice law in 1962. 24 Following his father's untimely death in
1963, however, Kennedy moved back to Sacramento, where he took over his father's law
practice, bought a house, and married Mary Davis, a teacher and fellow Stanford graduate.
Kennedy and Mary Davis have three children: two sons and a daughter. 25 In addition to his work
as a lawyer and a judge, Kennedy taught Constitutional Law at the University of Pacific's
McGeorge School of Law from 1968 to 1988. 26 A practical and modest man, Kennedy enjoys
his relative anonymity compared to the massive power he holds as the Supreme Court's regular
"swing vote." 27
B. The road to the Supreme Court is paved with Reagan's failures
In 1967, Kennedy did assorted legal work for the then-California governor Ronald
Reagan and his staff. 28 Notably, Kennedy drafted "Proposition 1," a proposed amendment to the
California constitution to curtail the state government's power to tax and spend.Z9 Although the
legislation was ultimately unsuccessful, Proposition 1 was a "starred credential" on Reagan's

°

resume during his later presidential run. 3 For his efforts, Kennedy was appointed to the Ninth

Jd.
See ANTHONY KENNEDY BIOGRAPHY, supra.
23 Jd.
24Jd.
25
Jd. See also Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, supra.
26
See ANTHONY KENNEDY BIOGRAPHY, supra.
27
See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, supra.
28 Jd.
29 Jd.
30 Jd.
21

22
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Circuit Court of Appeals in 1975, at the recommendation of Reagan to then President Gerald
Ford. 31 At 38, Kennedy became the youngest Court of Appeals judge in the country.
In 1987, Ronald Reagan nominated Kennedy to fill the Supreme Court Associate Justice
position vacated by Justice Louis Powell's retirement. 32 Kennedy was Reagan's third choice for
the position. Reagan's initial nominee, Robert Bork, was blocked by Senate democrats, and his
second option, Douglas Ginsburg, withdrew his nomination due to controversy involving his past
marijuana use. 33 The Senate unanimously confirmed the "squeaky-clean" Kennedy by a 97-0
vote on February 3, 1988.34
C. The man, the myth, the decider
When he was first nominated, Kennedy's background and demeanor suggested he would
not be much of a change from the retiring "center-right" Justice Powell. 35 Kennedy's time on the
Ninth Circuit was marked by his cautious approach and his tendency to "hew closely to
established doctrine."36 As expected, in his first term, Kennedy voted along conservative lines,
voting with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Scalia over 90% of the time. 37 Kennedy's voting
allegiances would, however, change, most notably beginning with the Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 38 decision.
Now, Kennedy is arguably the least predictable Supreme Court justice in terms of voting.
The deciding "swing" vote in many controversial cases, the Supreme Court under Kennedy's
quarter of a century tenure has often been referred to as the "Kennedy Court."39 And why not?

31 Jd
32Jd
33 ld
34
See ANTHONY KENNEDY BIOGRAPHY, supra.
35
See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, supra.
36ld
37
See ANTHONY KENNEDY BIOGRAPHY, supra.
38
Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
39
Adam Litpak, The Fragile Kennedy Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2006, at sec. A, p. 16.
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Since his appointment in 1988, Kennedy has been a member of the majority more than any other
Supreme Court justice. 40 In fact, during the 2006-2007 term, Kennedy was a member of the
majority in all24 cases decided by a 5-4 vote. 41 His former clerks and supporters are careful to
note that Kennedy's seemingly random jurisprudential decisions are a result of his openmindedness rather than indecisiveness. 42 Neal Katyal, President Barack Obama's former
Solicitor General, states, "[Kennedy] agonizes about trying to make the right decision, instead of
trying to fit the case into some formulaic box.'A3 Alex Kozinski, his former law clerk and the
current

)

Chief~ the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, adds, "[Kennedy] tr[ies] out an idea

for size, like trying on a hat," then sees if it looks good on him or not before making a decision.

44

In light of Kennedy's fluid jurisprudential philosophy, many lawyers have begun filing
"Kennedy briefs" that are written by his former clerks and borrow heavily from his prior
decisions. 45 Despite all attempts to stack the deck in their favor, the Kennedy briefs have not
guaranteed the desired results and Kennedy's decisionmaking "remain[s] unknowable."

Part II: Jurisprudential philosophy
A. Give me liberty or give me liberty
Justice Kennedy's jurisprudential philosophy centers on ensuring that the word "liberty"
is given "its full and necessary meaning, consistent with the purposes of the Constitution as we
understand it."46 For Kennedy, the Constitution contains "spacious phrases," phrases with
general concepts that contain moral content. 47 A judicial duty exists to find the full and

4

°FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 1.

41

See SCOTUS BLOG, Fina/5-4 decisions in OT06 (http;//www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/Final54visual.pdf).
42
See Massimo Calabresi & David Von Drehle, supra.
ld.
Jd.
45 ld.
46
See U.S. Senate, supra, p. 154, 122.
47
FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 11.
43

44
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necessary meaning of the Constitution's spacious phrases, and enforce the moral concepts within
it. To perform this duty, judges must engage in case-by-case moral arguments "about the nature
of liberty, human personality, and human dignity, as well as the judicial power to enforce
them."48 While the moral idea of liberty is "amorphous" and "wavering," uncertainty over the
precise standards of interpretation does not excuse judges from their expansive duty of
attempting to define and enforce liberty's moral content.

49

When questioned at his Confirmation hearing on what factors a judge should consider
when determining what the Constitution protects under liberty, Kennedy answered:
"a very abbreviated [non-exclusive] list of the considerations are the essentials of
the right to human dignity, the injury to the person, the harm to the person, the
anguish to the person, the inability of the person to manifest his or her own
personality, the inability of a person to obtain his or her own self-fulfillment, the
inability of a person to reach his or her potential. " 50
Kennedy rejects the Originalist' s position that the only sources for Constitutional
interpretation are the Constitution's text and original meaning at the time of its passage. While
Kennedy finds some link to the Framers' ideas as necessary for the judge's ruling to seem
legitimate, a historical study of the Constitution alone is insufficient to define and enforce the
moral concepts of liberty within it. 5 1 Kennedy notes, "Over time the intentions of the Framers
are more remote from their particular political concerns and so they have ... a certain generality
now that they did not have previously." 52 The Constitution "cannot be divorced from its logic
and language, the intention of its framers, the precedents of the law, and the shared traditions and
historic values of our people." 53 Had the Framers intended for the Constitution's text and

Jd.
See U.S. Senate, supra, p. 31.
50 d
l . at p. 180.
51
FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 4.
52
US Senate, supra, p. 180.
53
Anthony M. Kennedy, "Rotary Speech," Sacramento, Rotary Club, Oct. 15, 1987, p. 7.

48

49
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original meaning to explicitly answer every Constitutional issue raised thereafter, the Framers
would not have used general, spacious phrases like due process or cruel and unusual
punishment. 54 Instead, judges must exercise their own independent judgment to define and
enforce the moral content of liberty embodied in the Constitution's spacious clauses.
B. Stare decisis and non-traditional sources

To ensure that liberty is given its full and necessary meaning, the Constitution's moral
concepts themselves, rather than their prior interpretations, must provide the basis for
"determining the extent of the personal liberty that courts have a duty to enforce. " 55 Kennedy
criticizes judges "make a quick bow to the words and text and then go off into . . . [a] mass of
precedents." 56 As explained earlier, a judge's responsibility is to ensure that liberty is given its
full and necessary meaning, consistent with the purposes of the document as we understand it. " 57

It logically follows that a self-aware judge must then determine whether the Constitution's moral
concepts "extend ... to situations not previously addressed by the courts, to protections not
previously announced by the courts." 58 Thus, under Kennedy's jurisprudential philosophy,
judges must act like "architects" to "preserve the best elements of our past and to create
structures that meet the demands of a dynamic present and an uncertain future. " 59
To develop their architectural plan, judges may rely upon traditional and non-traditional
sources to provide "objective referents" to help define and enforce the moral content of liberty.
The Constitution's text, tradition, and history are the starting point, but not necessarily the

54

/d. at p. 6.
FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 13.
56
US Senate, supra, p. 231.
57
/d. at 154, 122 (emphasis added).
58
Anthony M. Kennedy, "Comments at Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference," Hawaii, Aug. 21, 1987, pp. 6-7, 87.
59
"Pasadena Dedication," Pasadena, California, Special Session of the Judges of the Ninth Circuit, Feb. 3, 1986, p.
10.
55
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ending point, for constitutional interpretation. 60 While the moral content of the Constitution may
be illuminated by history, tradition, original intent, and precedent, the full and necessary
meaning of liberty may extend beyond those sources. 61 Accordingly, Kennedy's opinions have
cited to social science research, the direction of political consensus ("evolving standards of
decency"), and international law to provide "objective referents" for the moral content of liberty
in our Constitution. 62 Kennedy's opinions have relied upon such sources, even when such
citations have ultimately led him to overturn past precedents and recant his own earlier votes. 63
Kennedy supports the use of a variety of sources, provided that the source aids in the substantive
consideration of whether the specific case's challenged action violates "the essentials of the right
of human dignity," results in "the inability of the person to manifest his or her own personality,
the inability of a person obtain his or her self-fulfillment, or the inability of a person to reach his
or her potential."64 The type of source appears inconsequential, so long as it allows the judge to
"discover the true nature of the substantive moral ideas stated in the text of the Constitution."65
Part III: The Establishment Clause
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. " 66
Kennedy's interpretation of the Establishment Clause distinguishes between government
action that accommodates religion versus government action that establishes religion. 67 As
discussed below, government action may accommodate to put religion on equal footing with
secular activities. Government action that requires an individual's forced rather than voluntary

60

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998).
FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 11 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571).
62
I d. at p. 36.
63
See FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at 30 (referring to Roper v. Simmons, discussed infra).
64
U.S. Senate, supra, at p. 180.
65
See FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 4.
66
·
U.S. Const. amend. I.
67
See generally FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 14.
61
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participation e~t,~P{~sqes reFgi~~ Kennedy's "coercion principle," his "ideal of liberty of
conscience against government coercion" in the belief and exercise of religion. 68
A. Establishing the coercion principle prior to Lee v. Weisman
For Kennedy, the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause preserve the uniquely
personal liberty decision to practice religion as one pleases without government interference. 69
Prior to his landmark Establishment Clause decision in Lee v. Weisman, Kennedy formulated the
foundations for his coercion principle in Allegheny County70 and Board of Education of Westside
Community Schools. 71 Conservatives on the Court, most notably Scalia, who mistook
Kennedy's position in these cases for Originalism would later harshly rebuke Kennedy in
Weisman for "betraying the Constitution."72
In Allegheny County, Kennedy voted to uphold the constitutionality of a menorah display
and creche display on public property in downtown Pittsburgh. 73 Criticizing the majority's
"unjustified hostility towards religion," Kennedy held that the Constitution "permits government
some latitude in recognizing and accommodating the central role religion plays in our society." 74
Kennedy carefully distinguished between government action which "accommodates" religion
versus government action that "establishes religion." 75 The government can neither coerce
support or participation for a religion, nor give direct benefits to a religion in such a way that
establishes or tends to establish a religious faith. 76 The government may, however, recognize

68

See generally id.
See generally id.
70
Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (Kennedy, A., concurring in part, dissenting

69

in part).
71

Bd. ofEduc. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens By & Through Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (Kennedy, A.,

concurring).
72

See generally FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 14.
Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 573.
74
!d. at 655.
75
!d. at 659.
76 !d.
73

-----
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religion through "passive and symbolic accommodation."77 Such accommodation does not
breach the Establishment Clause unless the government "benefits religion in way more direct and
more substantial than practices that are accepted in our national heritage." 78 Joined by Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, and White, Kennedy found the menorah and creche displays within the realm
of"flexible accommodation." 79 The displays neither advanced one faith over another, nor
compelled others to observe or participate. 80 Observers were free to view, ignore, or easily avoid
the displays. 81 As such, there was no "realistic risk" that the displays constituted state actions to
establish religion. 82
In Board ofEducation of Westside Community School, Kennedy voted to uphold federal
legislation that required secondary schools receiving federal aid to allow equal after-school
access to student groups based on "religious, political, philosophical, or other content." 83
Allowing religious groups equal access to the school after hours was an "incidental benefit" that
placed the religious groups on "the same footing" as secular school groups. 84 There was no risk
of state establishment of religion because the government was in no way coercing students to
participate in a religious activity, even though that religious activity took place on school
property. 85 Like the observers of the religious displays in Allegheny County, children could
choose to participate in the religious groups, ignore them for secular groups, or participate in

77

ld at 661-662.
Jd at 662-663.
79
Id. at 662.
80 ld

78

81
82

Jd.

ld at 663-664.
Ed ofEduc. of Westside Cmty. Sch. , 496 U.S. at 226.
84
I d. at 260.
85
I d. at 261.
83
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nothing. Foreshadowing Weisman, Kennedy does note that "the line between voluntary and
coerced participation may be difficult to draw." 86
B. Lee v. Weisman: the "coercion principle" (majority opinion# 1)
In Lee v. Weisman, writing for a 5-4 majority, Kennedy applied his coercion principle to
strike an invocation and benediction given at a middle school graduation on school property as a
violation of the Establishment Clause. 87 Kennedy initially voted that the graduation prayer was
Constitutional and was assigned to write the majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, but
reversed when he realized "my draft looked quite wrong." 88 Ironically, Kennedy was assigned to
write the new majority opinion striking the school prayer by Justice Blackmun, the senior justice
of the new majority. 89
Deborah Weisman graduated from Nathan Bishop Middle School, a public school, at a
formal ceremony in 1989. 90 The school had a policy that allowed principals to invite clergy
members to give invocations and benedictions at the school graduation. 91 Clergy members who
accepted were given a pamphlet entitled "Guidelines for Civic Occasions," informing them that
public prayer at nonsectarian events were to be prepared with "inclusiveness and sensitivity."92
The pamphlet further acknowledged that "prayer [was] inappropriate for some events. " 93 Over
Weisman's father's objections, a rabbi delivered an invocation and benediction at the school.

86

!d. at 261-262.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (Kennedy, A., majority).
88
Blackmun Papers, Box 586, Folder 6.
89
Blackmun Papers, Box 586, Folder 9.
90
Weisman, 505 U.S. at 581.
91 !d.
92 !d.
93 !d.
94
Jd. The text of the invocation and benediction can be found from 581-582.
87

94
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Weisman's father filed for a temporary restraining order and later apermanent injunction
to prohibit having invocations and benedictions during school graduation ceremonies. 95 The
district court held that the school's policy allowing school-led prayer at graduation ceremonies
violated the Establishment Clause. 96 Applying the tripartite "Lemon test," 97 the district court
found the school-led prayer violated the first prong of the test by identifying the state with a
religion or religion in general. 98 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit found that the school-led prayer violated all three prongs of the Lemon test. 99
Kennedy's opinion focuses on his coercion principle rather than the Lemon test.
Kennedy begins by restating the central principle of the Establishment Clause: "[the] government
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a
way which "establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so." 100 Religious belief
and expression are essential aspects of individual personality and liberty, and are "too precious to
be either proscribed or prescribed by the State." 101 Unlike the broad First Amendment
protections afforded to free speech, which extends even to speech by the government, the
Establishment Clause specifically prohibits state intervention in religious affairs because of
concerns over the state's powers to coerce and indoctrinate. 102 Attributing the public school
principal's actions to the state, the challenged school prayer violates this central principle
through pervasive state involvement that "creat[es] a state-sponsored and state-directed religious

95

/d. at 584.
/d.
97
As set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), for government activity to satisfy the Establishment
Clause, it must: ( 1) reflects a clearly secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and (3) avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.
98
Weisman, 505 U.S. at 585.
99
/d. at 586.
100
/d. at 587.
101
/d. at 589.
102
/d. at 591.
96
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Put more bluntly, by seeking "to produce a prayer to be used in a

formal religious exercise" at an event 'which students, for all practical purposes, are obliged to
attend," the school violated the Establishment Clause. 104
Distinct from the challenged governmental acts in Allegheny County and Board of
Education of Westside Community School, the prayer in Weisman took place at an event of great
importance where "attendance and participation ... were in a fair and real sense obligatory." 105
Although the parties stipulated that attending the graduation was voluntary, Kennedy vehemently
disagreed, stating, "to say that a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high school
graduation is formalism in the extreme." 106 Not attending graduation would require a student to
forfeit "intangible benefits" that motivated her through her school years, such as celebrating her
academic success with family and friends, and to denigrate the significance of the achievement
itself. 107 The students could not choose to ignore the graduation like a creche display or choose
not to attend or participate in the graduation like a religious after-school group, unless the student
wanted to sacrifice some of what she had earned by reaching this academic stage. The schoolled prayer violated Kennedy's coercion principle by placing dissenting students in an "untenable
position," using the inevitable choice to attend one's school graduation to coerce students into
forced participation in state-sponsored religion. 108
Kennedy is quick to note his heightened concerns at protecting the freedom of conscience
of schoolchildren in elementary and secondary public schools. 109 Research indicates that

103

ld. at 586.
Id. at 588-589.
105
ld. at 586.
106
I d. at 595(emphasis added).
107
ld. at 595-596.
108
See generally id. at 593.
1o9 Id.
104
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students of such a young age and in a group environment have a tendency towards conformity. 110
At a graduation ceremony in particular, young students are in a highly-controlled environment
where there is public pressure and peer pressure on attending students to stand as a group or, at
the very least, maintain respectful silence. 111 Objectors are "placed in the dilemma of
participating, with all that implies, or protesting." 112 Dissenting students can either cause a scene
by adhering to their beliefs or sacrifice their beliefs to avoid embarrassment and unwanted
attention. Kennedy concludes, "[i]t is a tenet of the First Amendment that the State cannot
require one of its Citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the price of resisting
conformance to state-sponsored religious practice." 113 For Kennedy, the choice alone produces
an intrusion on the individual's liberty of conscience against government coercion in the belief
and exercise of religion.
Part IV: Substantive Due Process and the 14th amendment
A. Lawrence v. Texas: Protecting Private Conduct Through Liberty (majority opinion# 2)
In Lawrence v. Texas 114 , writing for a 5-4 majority, Kennedy held that a Texas statute
proscribing two persons of the same sex from engaging in certain intimate sexual conduct
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by "impinging on the exercise of
liberty" of adult males to engage in consensual sodomy in the privacy of their own homes. 115
Lawrence expressly overruled the Court's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, where the court held

that a Georgia statute proscribing sodomy did not violate the fundamental rights of homosexuals
because the Constitution did not confer upon homosexuals a right to engage in sodomy. 116

110
111

ld.

See FRANK J. COLUCCI, supra, at p. 19.
Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593.
113
Jd. at 596.
114
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)(Kennedy, A., majority).
115
ld. at 564.
116
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189-190 (1986).
112
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Kennedy's Lawrence opinion criticizes Bowers for focusing too narrowly on whether the
Constitution protected a "fundamental right [of] homosexuals to engage in sodomy,"
"misapprehend[ing] the claim of liberty there presented." 117 Instead, Kennedy protects such
private activity through the full and necessary meaning of liberty, which "presumes an autonomy
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct." 118
Texas police officers were sent to John Geddes Lawrence's apartment in response to a
weapons disturbance. 119 There, the officers observed and arrested Lawrence and another man for
engaging in "deviate sexual intercourse," anal sex with a member of the same sex. 120 Both men
were adults at the time of the offense, their conduct was consensual, and the acts were conducted
in private. 121 Petitioners challenged the statute as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. 122 The trial court convicted Petitioners, and Court of Appeals for the
Texas Fourteenth District affirmed the conviction. 123
Consistent with his jurisprudential philosophy, Kennedy's Lawrence opinion uses the full
and necessary meaning of liberty to protect the private, homosexual conduct of consenting adult
males. 124 Using liberty rather than privacy to protect such conduct avoids textual objections,
bringing the issue's "moral and practical considerations" to the forefront. 125 At his confirmation
hearing, Kennedy stated, "[the] concept of liberty is quite expansive, [and] quite sufficient, to
protect the values of privacy that Americans legitimately think are part of their constitutional
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As such, Kennedy frames the issue as "whether the petitioners were free as adults

to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause." 127 The Bowers court's prior formulation of the issue,
"whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy,"

128

failed to "appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake." 129 Kennedy explains:
"To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a
married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse." 130

Unlike the Bowers court, the Lawrence court does not "misapprehend the claim of liberty
there presented to it." 131 Kennedy makes his holding clear: "adults may choose to enter upon
this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their
dignity as free person." 132 Both the statute in Bowers and the statute in Lawrence sought to
control an adult, homosexual male's personal relationship" by controlling "private human
conduct [and] sexual behavior, and in the most private of places." 133 The full and necessary
meaning of liberty, however, presumes an autonomy of self that includes "freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct." 134 By impinging on the consensual, intimate
sexual conduct of adult homosexual males in the privacy of their own homes, the State becomes
a dominant presence in a place in which it should not be present at all. 135 Such intrusion
demeans the homosexual individual and his relationship, stigmatizing their relationship as less
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worthy than more traditional relationships and leaving a permanent mark on the individual's
personality and his permanent criminal record. 136 Kennedy concludes:
"When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person,
the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make
this choice." 137
Kennedy's Lawrence opinion is also notable for its reliance on traditional and
nontraditional sources in reaching its conclusion. Kennedy uses precedent, history, and tradition
as a starting point for his analysis. 138 The precedent prior to Bowers indicated that the protection
of liberty under the Due process Clause had a "substantive dimension of fundamental
significance in defining the rights of the person." 139 In Eisenstadt, the court held:
" if the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 140
Further, in Roe v. Wade, the court held that a woman's right to choose to abort was
deserving of "real and substantive protection" as an exercise of her liberty under the Due Process
Clause.

141

The precedent following Bowers appeared to limit the scope of Bowers's holding. 142

In Casey, the court held that our laws and traditions afford constitutional protection to intimate
personal decisions relating to "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education." 143 Writing for the majority, Kennedy stated:
"These matters, involving the intimate and personal choices a person may make in
a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 144
136
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Kennedy's Lawrence opinion extends this Casey rationale to persons in homosexual
relationships. 145 Similarly, in Romer v. Evans, the court, with Kennedy again writing for the
majority, struck down on Equal Protection grounds Colorado legislation which explicitly refused
to recognize homosexuals as a protected class. 146

147

Next, Kennedy's Lawrence opinion looks to the history and tradition of our laws.
Kennedy finds that the United States has no longstanding history of laws "directed at
homosexual conduct as a distinct matter." 148 Laws which did prohibit sodomy prohibited
"noncreative sexual activity more generally," with no regard to whether the participants were of
the same or opposite sex. 149 Moreover, laws which prohibited sodomy do not seem to have been

°

enforced against "consenting adults acting in private." 15 Kennedy finds no "ancient roots,"
language used by the Bower court, in American laws targeting same-sex couples. 151 Such laws
did not develop until the 1970s, and, even then, were only enacted by nine states. 152 Further,
many states that passed laws targeting same-sex couples have since moved towards abolishing
those laws over the past few decades. 153 The only "ancient roots" for condemnation of
homosexual behavior stem from religion and traditional concepts of right and acceptable
behavior. 154 Kennedy matter-of-factly states that such consideration is not determinative for the

145
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Kennedy admits there it is "tenable" that Lawrence, like Romer v. Evans, could be decided on Equal Protection
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Court, and, quoting his majority opinion in Casey, notes, "our obligation is to define the liberty
of all, not to mandate our own moral code." 155
More controversially, Kennedy relies heavily on "emerging awareness" within the United
States and comparative international law to buttress his Lawrence analysis. Kennedy declares,
"history and tradition are the starting point, but not in all cases the ending point of the
substantive due process inquiry." 156 The expansive duty to define and enforce liberty's full
meaning and moral content under the Constitution may necessitate that the judge find "objective
referents" for liberty in non-traditional sources, such as emerging awareness and international
law. In reviewing the laws and traditions of the United States over the past half century,
Kennedy notes an emerging awareness that "liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons
in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." 157 In 1955, the
American Law Institute declined to recommend or provide for criminal penalties for consensual
. i~xual relations conducted in private. 158 Further, when Bowers was decided in 1986, 25 states
I

" w~ had laws proscribing sodomy. 159 Since Bowers, the number of states proscribing sodomy
hai' been reduced to 13 states, of which only four states enforce such laws only against
homosexual conduct. 160 Even where sodomy is proscribed, there is a "pattern of nonenforcement
with respect to consenting adults acting in private," including in Texas as of 1994. 161 Next,
Kennedy considers the comparative international law of other countries with similar JudeoChristian moral and ethical standards. 162 5 years prior to Bowers, the European Court of Human
Rights ("ECHR") held that "laws proscribing ... [consensual homosexual conduct] were invalid
155
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under the European Convention on Human Rights." 163 This declaration was authoritative when
Bowers was decided and remained authoritative after Bowers was decided, despite the fact that

--{,~ ,.1 , "~

the ECHR's membership has expanded from 21 nations to 45 nations during that time. 164
At the time of Lawrence, the position in Bowers seemed unique to the United States.

vVy~\Y

v \) ~

While Kennedy admits that "stare decisis is essential ... to the stability of the law," he continues
to say that "[stare decisis] is not, however, an exorable command." 165 The Constitution's moral
concepts themselves, rather than their prior interpretations, must provide the basis for
"determining the extent of the personal liberty that courts have a duty to enforce." 166 Here,
Bowers lacked the detrimental individual and social reliance that is typical of most precedent. In
fact, Bowers itself"cause[d] uncertainty," as precedents before and after Bowers, subsequent
actions by state legislatures, and international law conflicted with Bowers' central holding. 167
Kennedy bluntly declares, "Bowers was not correct when decided and [is] not correct today." 168
Overruling Bowers, Kennedy holds that in the exercise of their liberty, adults may engage in
intimate, consensual sexual conduct with members of the same-sex "in the confines of their
homes and their private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons." 169
Part V: Cruel and Unusual Punishment
A. Roper v. Simmons: the "emerging awareness" on juvenile death penaltv 170 (majority
opinion #3)
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writing for a 5-4 majority, Kennedy held that the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment forbid imposing the death penalty on offenders who were under age 18
at the time their capital crimes were committed. 172 Roper expressly overruled the Court's
decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, where the court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments did not proscribe the execution of offenders who were over the age of 15 but under
18 as cruel and unusual punishment. 173 The majority opinion in Stanford, written by Scalia and
joined by Kennedy, indicated there was no national consensus on whether the execution of
offenders aged between 15 and 18 years old was proscribed by the Constitution, as 22 of 37
death penalty states permitted the execution of 16 year old offenders and 25 of 37 permitted it for
17 year old offenders. 174
At age 17, Christopher Simmons and two even younger confederates conspired to and
committed murder. 175 Simmons detailed his plan to break into a woman's home, burgle her
home, tie her up, and throw the victim off of a bridge. 176 Simmons and his two co-conspirators
performed their plan to the letter, concluding with their tying the victim up with electrical wire
and throwing her off a bridge, leaving her to drown in the waters below. 177 Simmons was
arrested and charged, inter alia, with murder. 178 He waived his Miranda rights and made a full
confession. 179
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By the time Simmons was tried and sentenced, he had turned 18. 180 The State of
Missouri sought the death penalty for Simmons. 181 Defense counsel reminded the jury that
people of Simmons' age "cannot drink, serve on juries, or even see certain movies, because 'the
legislatures have wisely decided that individuals of a certain age aren't responsible enough. "'

182

The jury recommended the death penalty for Simmons, and the judge accepted their
recommendation. 183 The Missouri trial court denied Simmons' motion for post-conviction relief
by reason of ineffective assistance of counsel. 184 Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided

Atkins v. Virginia, in which it held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the
execution of mentally handicapped persons. 185 Simmons filed a new petition for state
postconviction relief, arguing that Atkins established that the Constitution prohibited the
execution of juveniles who were under the age of 18 when they committed their capital
offense. 186 The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, and resentenced Simmons to "life
imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the governor,"
citing the "national consensus ... against the execution of juvenile offenders." 187

188

Like liberty, "cruel and unusual punishment" is a spacious phrase in the Constitution.
Judges have an expansive duty to find the full and necessary meaning of "cruel and unusual
punishment," and enforce the moral concepts within it. 189 To perform this duty, judges must
engage in case-by-case moral arguments "about the nature of liberty, human personality, and
180
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human dignity, as well as judicial power to enforce them. 190 Imposing the death penalty on
juvenile offenders classifies as cruel and unusual punishment because of the extent to which it
disproportionately violates the juvenile offender's liberty. The death penalty prevents the
juvenile offender from ever manifesting his or her personality, from obtaining his or her own
self-fulfillment, and prevents the individual from ever reaching his or her potential, all of which
are factors protected by the Constitution under the full and necessary meaning ofliberty. 191
Kennedy's entire analysis in Roper revolves around finding the juvenile offender less
capable than an adult offender who commits a similar crime, as the juvenile offender has not yet
fully developed his personality or fixed his traits to become who he will ultimately be.

192

The

death penalty is the "most severe punishment," ... [and] should be limited to those offenders who
commit "a narrow category of the most serious crimes" and whose extreme culpability makes
them "the most deserving of execution." 193 Kennedy states that juvenile offenders "cannot be
classified with reliability among the worst offenders" in the way that adult offenders can be.

194

First, juveniles lack maturity and have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, resulting in a
proclivity for impetuous, ill-considered actions. 195 Second, juveniles are more susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures than adults. 196 Quoting precedent, Kennedy states,
"youth ... is a time and condition when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to
psychological change." 197 Third, a juvenile's character is not as well formed as that of an adult,
with more transitory and less fixed character traits. 198 In light of their fluid character traits,
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incomplete personality, and susceptibility for influence, the behavior of juveniles "is not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult." 199 For Kennedy, the.juvenile offender's youth is a
mitigating factor because "the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature,
the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside. " 200
Sentencing a juvenile offender, such as Simmons, to the death penalty permanently stunts the
growth of his personality and potential, before he or the Court can ever determine if the crime
was symptomatic of an irretrievably depraved character deserving of the death penalty or if the
crime was an uncharacteristic mistake of the man he could have become.
Notably, Kennedy relies upon non-traditional sources to support his contention that the
death penalty for juveniles is a "punishment[] ... so disproportionate as to be cruel and
unusual."201 Kennedy cites to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society," social science research, and international law to provide "objective referents"
for the moral content of liberty. First, enactments by state legislatures and the Court's own
determination demonstrate that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles.
Kennedy remarks that the evolving standards of decency that proscribed the death penalty
against the mentally impaired in Atkins is very similar to the national consensus to proscribe the
death penalty against juveniles?02 30 states prohibit the juvenile death penalty, including 12 that
prohibit the death penalty altogether and another eight states that maintain the death penalty but,
"by express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach. " 203
Additionally, juries recommend the death penalty for juveniles very infrequently? 04 Kennedy

199
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posits that the slower rate of juvenile death penalty abolition over the last 15 years, in
comparison to the abolition of the death penalty against the mentally impaired, is likely a result
of the juvenile death penalty gaining wider recognition earlier. 205 Second, Kennedy cites to
scientific studies, sociological studies, and psychological studies to show that juvenile offenders
do not reliably share the same culpability as adult offenders committing the same crime. 206
Lastly, Kennedy cites to international law to demonstrate that imposing the death penalty
on juveniles constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Kennedy points out that the "United
States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile
death penalty."207 Since 1990, only seven countries have executed juvenile offenders, but, other
than the United States, all of those countries have since repudiated the practice.

208

While the

opinion of the world community is not controlling, it does provide "respected and significant
confirmation for our own conclusions."209 In response to Justice Scalia's vociferous dissent
decrying reliance on "alien law" to interpret the Constitution, Kennedy continues:

"It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or pride in its origins to
acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other
nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within
our own heritage offreedom."210

Namely, what the traditional and non-traditional sources of Constitutional interpretation
used by Kennedy in Roper make clear is that "when a juvenile offender commits a heinous
crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but the State cannot
extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity." 211
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Part VI: Abortion
A. Kennedy's abortion jurisprudence prior to Casey
Kennedy has admittedly struggled with the issue of abortion during his 25 years on the
Supreme Court. 212 In the years leading to Casey, Kennedy's opinions on abortion attempted to
limit rather than overturn the import of the holding in Roe v. Wade. 213 Specifically, Kennedy
attempted to limit the holding of Roe in such a way that would "allow for more governmental
regulation of the procedure while retaining a judicial role in enforcing individualliberty."214
In Webster, the court addressed a Missouri law which required that doctors test for fetal
age before performing an abortion, if he had reason to believe the fetus was 20 weeks or older? 15
The court held that the requirement was a reasonable regulation for promoting the State's interest
in protecting potential human life. 216 The court upheld the regulation despite the fact that the
regulation would be unconstitutional under Roe's trimester framework? 17 While he joined the
majority opinion, in conference, Kennedy stated that he would not find the right to abort to be a
fundamental right under the right of privacy or the Equal Protection Clause, but rather as a
protected liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause? 18 To Kennedy, such
a change would "return this debate to the democratic process." Kennedy's later opinions would
show that a 'return to the democratic process" meant giving state's more latitude to regulate the
abortion procedure, in light of their interest in promoting respect for fetal life and free and
informed choices? 19
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In Hodgson, the court upheld a statute that required minors to wait 48 hours prior to

~abortion, but rejected its requirement that both parents be notified of the abortion.

obtai~
an

220

Kennedy wrote a concurrence that upheld both the time delay and parental notification
requirements, unless the minor obtained a judicial bypass. 221 To justify the notification
requirement, Kennedy cited to the states interests in (1) promoting the welfare of pregnant
minors; and (2) acknowledging and promoting the role of parents in the care and upbringing of
their children. 222 Kennedy emphasized the importance of family ties, both for the minors in
making their abortion decision and for their parents's liberty interest in having a reasonable
opportunity to develop close relations with their children?23 Mirroring later language about
abortion decisions having "consequences beyond the fetus," here the notification requirement did
not place an "absolute obstacle" on any minor seeking an abortion, and represented a
"considered weighing of the competing interests of minors and their parents. "

224

In Akron Center, heard by the Court on the same day as Hodgson, the court heard a state
that, inter alia, required physicians performing an abortion on a minor to provide timely notice to
~

the minor's parent, unless the physician obtained a judicial bypass. 225 Writing for a plurality,
Kennedy held that the law did not impose "an undue or otherwise unconstitutional burden on a
minor seeking an abortion. " 226 The language Kennedy uses lays the foundation for Casey and
his later abortion decisions, wherein he uses liberty rather than privacy to protect the right to
abort and justifies greater government regulation of the procedure. 227 A woman's decision to
abort is a "grave one that will embrace her own destiny and personal dignity, and the origins of
220
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the other human life that lies within the embryo." 228 Kennedy argues that it is rational for the
state to assume the beginning of that understanding will come from the family, and that is fair for
the State to pass laws to allow that family to give a "lonely or even terrified minor" advice. 229
Kennedy concludes:
"It would deny all dignity to family to say state cannot take reasonable step in
regulating its health professions to ensure that in most cases a young woman will
receive guidance and understanding from a parent. " 230
With his rhetoric in Akron Center, Kennedy strives to classify a woman's decision to
abort as a philosophical choice that implicates the woman's personal destiny and dignity?31
. Using paternalistic language, Kennedy emphasizes the gravity of the decision and the importance
I

/ of a family support system to

advi~ the 'terrified minor."232

By demonstrating that a woman's

decision to abort is informed by her family's advice, Kennedy sets the stage to discuss the effect
that abortion has on the woman's family. 233 Then, to protect the woman's family and their
liberty interest in raising and remaining close to their child, greater state regulation on abortion is
necessary. 234 Once that has been established, Kennedy could justify greater state regulation in
order to protect the state's own interests in a woman's decision to abort, while also upholding the
core holding of Roe. 235
B. Planned Parenthood v. Casey: shifting the foundation of abortion to liberty (majority
opinion# 4)
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31

the Court reviewed the constitutionality of changes made to the Pennsylvania

abortion statute. The proposed changes required a woman seeking an abortion to: (1) give
informed consent prior to the procedure; (2) endure a 24 hour waiting period before the
procedure is performed; (3) if a minor, to obtain the informed consent of one of her parents, with
the possibility of judicial bypass; (4) if married, woman must sign a statement indicating
husband has been notified. 237 Additionally, the changes imposed reporting requirements on
facilities providing abortion services. 238 Prior to the provisions going into effect, petitioners, five
abortion clinics and one physician providing abortion services, filed for declaratory and
injunctive relief. 239 Writing for a 5-4 majority, Kennedy upheld all the abortion procedure
regulations other than the spousal notification requirement, finding that the other four regulations
did not pose an "undue burden" on a woman's right to choose to abort. 240
In reaching this conclusion, the Court reaffirmed the holding of Roe and recast Roe's
constitutional foundations in liberty. 241 As an initial matter, the Court restates what it believes
are the three prongs of Roe's central holding. 242 First, a woman has the right to choose to have
an abortion before the fetus is viable243 without undue interference from the state. 244 Prior to the
fetus' viability, the State's interests are not strong enough to support prohibiting or imposing
substantial obstacles on a woman's right to abort. 245 Second, the State can restrict abortions after
the fetus becomes viable, provided the law contains exceptions where the pregnancy endangers
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the woman's life or health. 246 Third, from the outset of the pregnancy, the State has legitimate
interests in protecting the woman's health and the life of the fetus that may become a child. 247
Kennedy believes that this important state interest provided for in Roe has been overlooked by

Roe's progeny. 248
Having established what Roe stands for, the Court explains why Roe should not be
overtum~d

c..~

by stye decisis.

249

\./\~..

When the Court reexamines a prior holding, it is customarily

informed by prudential and pragmatic considerations to test the consistency and respective costs
of reaffirming or overruling a prior case.

250

~

Here, overruling Roe would-e~~at for

over two decades, people have created intimate relationships and "defined themselves and their
places in society "in reliance on the availability of abortion .. [should] contraception fail. " 251

Roe's passage has not made it so courts are likely to "hand down erroneous decisions." Kennedy
concludes, "[t]he sum of the precedential enquiry to this point shows Roe's underpinnings
unweakened in any way affecting its central holding. While it has engendered disapproval, it has
not been unworkable." 252
With the central holding of Roe reaffirmed, Kennedy attempts to reclassify a woman's
right to choose to abort as a right protected under liberty. 253 Kennedy states:
"The Constitutional protection [for] the woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It
declares that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." The controlling word in the cases before us is
"liberty."254
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Kennedy recasts the right to choose to abort as a substantive liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Although not expressly enumerated in the
Constitution, Kennedy reminds the reader that not all liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment are expressly mentioned in the Constitution. 255 Indeed, "the full scope of the liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. " 256 The Constitution's full and
necessary meaning of liberty does, however, clearly "place[] limits on [the] state's right to
interfere with person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood, as well as bodily
integrity. 257 The law guarantees Constitutional protection to this type of "personal decisions"
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. " 258 In his famous "heart of liberty" passage, Kennedy makes this clear:

(

/

"These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central
to the liberty protected by the 14th amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life."259

/ Beliefs about tors typtof matters could not define the "attributes of personhood" if they
were formed under compulsion of the State?60 Given the anguish a woman would experience
from being denied the choice to abort, majority and historical beliefs about fetal life and
motherhood "cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. 261 Kennedy

255
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I d. at 847.
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declares, "[The Supreme Court's] obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our
own moral code. 262
While the State cannot flatly prohibit a woman's right to choose to abort, the Court is
careful to note that the consequences from a woman's choice to abort affect more than just that
woman and her fetus. Kennedy describes the ripples cascading from a woman's choice to abort:
"Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for
the woman who must live with the implications of her decision; for the persons
who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and society
which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist."263
Kennedy continues, "It was this dimension of personal liberty that Roe sought to
protect. " 264 By mentioning all those affected by a choice to abort, Kennedy sets the foundation
to discuss the interests of the other affected persons and how to protect those interests.
Kennedy begins by establishing the State's interests in a woman's choice to abort. He
notes, "[a] woman's liberty [to abort] is not so unlimited ... that from the outset [of pregnancy]
the State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn. " 265 On the "other side of the
equation" is the State's interest in protecting potential life. 266 While Roe acknowledged the
State's "important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of life," subsequent
abortion cases have done too little to acknowledge and protect this State interest. 267 Indeed, Roe
and subsequent cases have treated all pre-viability government attempts to influence a woman's
decision to abort as unwarranted, choosing to completely insulate the woman until the fetus
becomes viable at the expense of the State's interest. 268 Additionally, Kennedy establishes that
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the State has an interest in ensuring that the woman's choice to abort is "thoughtful and
informed," and can take steps to protect said interest, even before viability. 269
To better protect the State's legitimate interests in a woman's choice to abort, Kennedy
abandons Roe's rigid trimester270 framework in favor of an undue burden standard?71 The Court
found that the trimester system was not an essential part of Roe's holding. 272 The trimester
framework was not necessary to protect the woman's right to choose to abort, and, more
importantly, was extremely ineffective in protecting the State's legitimate interests in protecting
the potentiality of fetal life and ensuring that women made thoughtful and informed decisions on
whether to abort? 73 Instead, the Court applied the undue burden standard to state regulation of
abortion:
"Only when state regulation of abortion imposes an undue burden on woman's
ability to decide whether to terminate pregnancy does power of state reach into
heart of liberty protected by due process clause; fact that regulation has incidental
effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure abortion cannot be
enough to invalidate it. " 274
Under the undue burden standard, State regulation imposed an undue burden on a .
woman's decision to abort if the regulation "has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of women who seek the abortion of a nonviable fetus." 275 Regulations which
only create structural mechanisms for the state, or a minor's parent or guardian, to "express
profound respect for the life of the unborn" are permitted, as long as the regulation is not a

269
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substantial obstacle to a woman's right to choose? 76 With the undue burden standard, the Court
could reconcile the state's interests in human life and ensuring women made thoughtful,
informed choices with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty in deciding whether to
abort. 277 Further, under the undue burden standard, the State could now more freely regulate
abortion at the pre-viability stage. The undue burden standard protected what the trimester
framework could not, and without sacrificing the woman's constitutionally protected liberty.
Applying the new undue burden standard, Kennedy upheld all of the changes to the
Pennsylvania abortion statute, with the exception of the spousal notification requirement.

278

Kennedy upheld the informed consent requirement, 24 hour waiting period requirement, parental
notification requirement, and reporting requirements based on the State's interest in a woman's
decision to abort being more "informed and deliberate." 279 The spousal notification requirement
was struck as adult women would not benefit from consulting their husbands in the way minors
would from consulting their parents? 80

Casey reverberates as a resounding success for Kennedy and his jurisprudential project.
In Casey, Kennedy was able to modify and narrow Roe without overturning it, recast the
foundation of abortion from privacy to liberty, and allow for greater democratic regulation of the
abortion procedure based on moral concerns by better protecting the State's interests in
abortion. 281
C. Stenberg v. Carhart: a step back from Casey? (dissenting opinion# 1)
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In Stenberg282 , the Court invalidated a Nebraska statute that banned all "partial birth
abortions," without regard to the health of the mother. The Nebraska statute defined a "partial
birth abortion" as "an abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion partially
delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and completely the
delivery. 283 Carhart, a Nebraska physician who performs abortions at a clinic, filed suit that the
Nebraska statute was unconstitutional, and sought an injunction to prevent its enforcement.

284

The district court held the statute unconstitutional and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's decision. 285
In a 5-4 majority, Justice Breyer struck down the law as unconstitutional for two reasons.
First, Nebraska's ban on partial birth abortions was unconstitutional because the law lacked any
exception for preservation of the mother's health. 286 The Court concludes, "where substantial
medical authority supports the proposition that banning a particular abortion procedure could
endanger women's health, Casey requires the statute to include a health exception."287 Second,
the Nebraska ban on partial birth abortions was unconstitutional because the statute's vague
language could be applied to the commonly used dilation and evacuation (D & E) procedure as
well as to the more dangerous dilation and extraction (D & X) procedure. 288 Breyer explains,
"even if the statute's basic aim is to ban D & X, its language makes clear that it also covers a
much broader category ofprocedures." 289 In prohibiting the commonly used dilation and
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evacuation procedure, the law unduly burdened women's right to choose to abort by placing a
substantial obstacle on the ability of women to obtain an abortion. 290
Dissenting, Kennedy held that Nebraska's ban on partial birth abortions did not unduly
burden women's ability to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, in that the law did not have
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus. 291 Instead, under the framework of Casey, Nebraska's law advanced its
legitimate State interests in promoting the life of the unborn and ensuring respect for all human
life and its potential. 292
For Kennedy, Casey is premised, inter alia, on the States having "an important
constitutional role in defining their interests in the abortion debate. " 293 Casey described the
State's interests in promoting the life of the unborn, respect for all human life, and encouraging
thoughtful and informed abortion decisions by women. 294 Additionally, States also have an
interest in proscribing medical procedures which they reasonably determine "might cause the
medical profession or society as a whole to become insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including
life in the human fetus. " 295 To protect this interest, a State can take steps to ensure that medical
professionals are viewed as healers, who are "sustained by a compassion and rigorous ethic and
cognizant of the dignity and value of human life, even life which cannot survive without the
assistance of others."296 Here, in its brief, Nebraska described its interests as "including concern
for the life of the unborn and 'for the partially-born, "in preserving the integrity of the medical
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profession, and in 'erecting a barrier to infanticide."297 Kennedy frankly states, "A review of
Casey demonstrates the legitimate of [Nebraska's] policies. The Court should say so."298
Kennedy takes the majority to task for failing to award any weight to Nebraska's
legitimate State interests. His repeated use of the colorful word "abortionist" and lengthy,
graphic description of the D & X procedure indicate his moral discomfort with the D & X
procedure and his incredulity at the majority's opinion. 299 Kennedy accuses the majority of
viewing the procedure from ''the perspective of an abortionist," rather than from "the perspective
of a society shocked when confronted with a new method of ending life."300 In light of
Nebraska's intent to only ban the D & X procedure and the graphic description of the D & X
procedure, it goes without saying that "Nebraska's ban on partial birth abortion furthers purposes
States are entitled to pursue. 301 Notably, Kennedy makes a point to discuss Justice O'Connor's
contention that Nebraska's ban does not further its stated interests because the permitted D & E
method is "no less dehumanizing than the [proscribed] D & X method. " 302 Kennedy replies:
"The issue is not whether members of the judiciary can see a difference between
the two procedures. It is whether Nebraska can. The Court's refusal to recognize
Nebraska's right to declare a moral difference between the procedures is a
dispiriting disclosure of the illogic and illegitimacy of the Court's approach to the
entire case."303
Unlike the majority, Kennedy takes no issue with Nebraska's failure to include a health
exception in its law, to allow D & X whenever the physician thinks it is best for the health of the
woman. By deferring to the doctor's judgment through a health exception, the State would allow
individual physicians to "set [the] abortion policy for the State ofNebraska, [rather than] the
297
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Such deference would require the Court to revisit pre-Row cases,

which gave a physician's treatment decisions controlling weight. 305 Instead, Kennedy follows

Casey, which does not give precedence to the views of a single physician or group of physicians
regarding a particular procedure's relative safety. 306 In further support, Kennedy cites to relevant
medical authorities who opine that a health exception would be D & X unnecessary:
"The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) "could
identify no circumstances under which [D & Xl would be the only option to save
the life or preserve the health of the woman." App. 600-601. The [American
Medical Association] AMA agrees, stating the "AMA's expert panel, which
included an ACOG representative, could not find 'any' identified circumstance
where [D & X] was 'the only appropriate alternative." 307
Lastly, Kennedy addresses the majority's position that the Nebraska law forbade both the
D & X procedure and the more common D & E procedure, thus unduly burdening a woman's
right to choose to abort. 308 By making such argument, the majority contradicts Casey's premise
that States have an important Constitutional role in defining their interests in the abortion debate
and misapplies well-settled doctrines of statutory construction. 309 Kennedy explains, "[to]
requir[ e] a State to meet [such] unattainable standards of statutory draftsmanship in order to have
its voice heard on this grave ... subject is no different from foreclosing state participation
altogether. " 31 0
Turning to statutory interpretation, Kennedy states that the Nebraska law only applies to
D & X procedures based on statutory references to "partial-birth abortion, "delivery" of a fetus,"
and requiring that delivery occur "before" the death-causing procedure? 11 First, the term "partial
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birth abortion" is synonymous with the D & X procedure. 312 Carhart's lead expert prefaced his
description ofD & X by noting that D & X has been called "partial-birth abortion" by the lay
press.313 The AMA agrees, stating that "the 'partial birth abortion' legislation is by its very name
aimed exclusively [at the D & X.] There is no other abortion procedure which could be confused
with that description." 314 Second and third, the proscribed procedure requires partial delivery of
the fetus into the vagina and completion of a "delivery" at the end of the procedure?

15

Kennedy

elucidates, and the AMA concurs, "Only removal of an intact fetus can be described as a
"delivery" of a fetus and only the D & X involves an intact fetus." 316 By contrast, D & E leaves
the physician with "a tray full of pieces," constituting neither delivery nor an intact fetus.

317

Thus, as intended, Nebraska's law would only operate to prohibit D & X procedures, and would
not operate to place a substantial obstacle on any woman seeking to abort. If a woman chose to
abort, the common D & E procedure would still be available to her. As Nebraska's law serves
legitimate State interests and does not have the purpose or effect of "deny[ing] women a safe
abortion," the law imposes no undue burden on a woman's ability to decide to terminate her
pregnancy.

Part VII: Substantive Due Process under the 5th Amendment
A. United States v. Windsor: the equal liberty of same sex marriage(majority opinion #5)
In the recently decided Windsor 318 , the Court addressed the constitutionality of the
Defense of Marriage Act's ("DOMA") definition of marriage. In relevant part, DOMA stated:
"In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation,
or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
312
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States, the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." 319
Section 3 of DOMA, which defines "marriage" and "spouse," does not forbid States
from enacting laws which permit same-sex marriage or civil unions. 320 The section is, however,
binding on over 1,000 federal laws and regulations. 321
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, both women, met in 1963 in New York, New York, and,
soon after, entered into a romantic relationship. 322 In 1993, after New York city extended the
right to same-sex couples, Windsor and Spyer registered themselves as domestic partners. 323 In
2007, after 40 years of partnership, the couple married in Ontario, Canada and returned home to
New York. 324 The State ofNew York acknowledged the couple's marriage as valid. 325 When
Spyer died in 2009, she left her entire estate to Windsor. 326 Windsor attempted to claim the
estate tax exemption327 for surviving spouses, but her claim was denied because DOMA denied
federal recognition to same-sex spouses. 328 Subsequently, Windsor paid $363,053 in estate taxes
and sought a refund for same from the IRS, who similarly denied Windsor's claim, concluding
that she was not a surviving spouse under DOMA. 329
Windsor filed suit in federal court that DOMA violated equal protection under the Fifth
Amendment. 330 While her suit was pending, the US Attorney General notified the Speaker of the
House of Representatives that the Department of Justice "would no longer defend the
319
320
321
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constitutionality of section 3 ofDOMA," the section which defined marriage and spouse. 331 The
court did, however, allow the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group ("BLAG") of the House of
Representatives to intervene as an interested party to defend the constitutionality of Section 3 of
DOMA.

332

The district court held that Section 3 ofDOMA was unconstitutional and ordered the

government to pay Windsor her refund. 333 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 334 As
of the date the Court heard Windsor, Windsor had not received her refund and the Executive
Branch continued to enforce Section 3 ofDOMA. 335
As an initial matter, Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, addressed standing and
prudential concerns. The Court held that Windsor had standing to bring the case and that there
was a justiciable controversy. 336 Windsor suffered an immediate, redressable economic injury
when she was forced to pay estate taxes which she would be exempt from if not for the validity
of§ 3 ofDOMA. 337 While the government refused to defend the constitutionality of§ 3 of
DOMA, there was still a justiciable controversy because, in refusing to give effect to the court's
order to pay Windsor her refund, Windsor had a "concrete, persisting, and unredressed"
injury." 338 The Court stated that prudential concerns, which protect courts from "deciding
abstract questions of wide public significance, would not prevent it from hearing the case, as
such concerns were overridden by the participation of amici curae. 339 Here, BLAG's defense of
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Section 3 ofDOMA's constitutionality assured the adversarial presentation of issues with
vigor. 340
Kennedy begins his substantive analysis by noting an emerging awareness by states of
same-sex marriage.

341

Until recent years, many_...Citizens likely had not considered the possibility

of same-sex marriage, let alone that same-sex marriage might "aspire to occupy the same status
and dignity as that of a man and woman in lawful marriage. " 342 Over time, more and more
States began to recognize same-sex marriage with the same recognition and validity as
traditional marriage between a man and a woman. 343 Indeed, the emerging awareness from these
States indicated that "limiting lawful marriage to heterosexual couples ... [was] an unjust
exclusion."344 In particular, New York first recognized same-sex marriages performed
elsewhere, and then amended its own marriage laws to permit same-sex marriage. 345 In doing so,
New York enlarged the definition of marriage to "correct what its Citizens and elected
representatives perceived to be an injustice that they had not earlier known or understood." 346
Defining and regulating marriage has been treated as a "virtually exclusive province of
the states," subject to the condition that such laws must respect a person's constitutional rights. 347
The state has traditionally and historically possessed full, undelegated power over marriage and
divorce. 348 Congress does have some ability to enact discrete statutes that bear on marital rights
and privileges, but precedent indicates that such limited laws are only constitutional if they
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regulate marriage's meaning in order to further federal policy. 349 Consistent with this allocation
of authority, the Federal Government has historically deferred to state-law policy decisions on
marriage and divorce. 350
Comparing the much broader and less deferential DOMA against this rubric, Kennedy
finds:
"DOMA rejects the long-established precept that the incidents, benefits, and
obligations of marriage are uniform for all married couples within each State,
though they may vary, subject to constitutional guarantees, from one State to the
next."35I
Rather than focusing on potential federalism concerns, Kennedy's analysis here focuses
on the effect that the State's decision to grant same-sex marriage has on the same-sex married
1

couple. 352 Kennedy explains, "the state's decision to give this class of persons the right to marry
conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import."353 When the State used its
"historical and essential authority" to define marriage in this way, the State enhanced the
"recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in their own community."354 Such language and
rhetoric is typical of Kennedy's jurisprudential goal of putting liberty and its moral content at the
heart of constitutional interpretation. Mirroring, and later quoting, his language in Lawrence,
Kennedy affirms that the State's interest in defining and regulating marriage stems from its
understanding that "marriage more than a routine classification for purpose of certain statutory
benefits. " 355 Instead, marriage and the intimacy it entails are "element[s] in a personal bond that
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is more enduring. " 356 By recognizing the validity of same-sex marriage in its own and other
jurisdictions, "New York sought to give further protection and dignity to that bond."357
In light of this analysis, Kennedy holds that DOMA's definition of marriage is an
unconstitutional deprivation of the liberty of persons protected by the Fifth Amendment. 358 In
essence, "DOMA seeks to injure the very class [that] New York seeks to protect." 359 DOMA's
unusual deviation from tradition involving defining marriage, the history ofDOMA's enactment,
and its express and demonstrated purpose indicate a "bare Congressional desire to harm a

°

politically unpopular group through disparate treatment of that group." 36 First, DOMA departs
from the history and tradition of federal reliance on state law to define marriage. 361 Second, the
history ofDOMA's enactment indicates that interfering with the equal dignity of same-sex
marriage was more than an incidental effect of its federal statute. It was its essence. " 362 In
House Report 3396, which discussed the passage ofDOMA, Congress stated, "it is both
appropriate and necessary for Congress to do what it can to defend the institution of traditional
heterosexual marriage." 363 The House went on to conclude that DOMA expresses "both moral
disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with
traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality. " 364 Further, the Act's "title and dynamics"
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indicate its purpose
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freedom of couples married under those laws. 365 The Act makes it clear that if any State does
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decide to recognize same-sex marriage, those unions will be treated as "second-class marriages"
under the federal law. 366
Kennedy concludes, "though Congress has great authority to design laws to fit its own
conception of sound national policy, it cannot deny the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment."367 Here, DOMA has the "prinE!J>urpose and the necessary
effect ... of demean[ing] those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage," denigrating
those persons to a "second-tier marriage." 368 No legitimate policy purpose can overcome
DOMA's purpose and effect of"disparag[ing] and injur[ing] those that the state sought to protect
in personhood and dignity." 369 The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
clause prohibits such disparate treatment under the law, rendering DOMA unconstitutional.

Part VIII: Free Speech
A. Texas v. Johnson: protecting political protest and the right to dissent (concurring opinion
# 1)
In Johnson, 370 the Court addressed the issue of flag desecration during political protest
rallies. With Justice Brennan writing for a 5-4 majority, the Court held that defendant's act of
burning an American flag during a protest rally constituted expressive conduct that was protected
under the First Amendment. 371
While attending the Republican National Convention in Dallas in 1984, Johnson
participated in a political protest entitled the "Republican War Chest Tour."372 The event
protested the policies of Ronald Reagan's administration and certain Dallas-based
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Demonstrators marched through the streets of Dallas chanting political slogans

and staging "die-ins," "intended to dramatize the consequences of nuclear war." 374 Some
protestors, but not Johnson, also spray-painted buildings and overturned potted plants. 375 The
protest culminated in front of Dallas City Hall. 376 There, Johnson "unfurled an American flag,
doused it in kerosene, and set it on fire," while protestors chanted, "America, the red, white, and
blue, we spit on you. " 377 While no one was injured, several witnesses attested to being
"seriously offended" by the flag burning. 378
Johnson was the only protestor to be charged with a crime? 79 He was charged with
"desecration of a venerated object ... [under] Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(3) (1989)."380
After trial, Johnson was convicted, and sentenced to one year in prison plus a $2,000 fine. 381
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 382 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however,
reversed, holding that Johnson's flag burning was symbolic speech protected by the First
Amendment. 383
The Court held that based on the context of Johnson's flag burning being part of a
political demonstration taking place near a political convention to nominate a Republican
candidate to run for President, Johnson's action constituted expressive conduct protected by the
First Amendment. 384 Brennan concludes, "if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
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Amendment, it is that government may not prohibit expression of an idea simply because society
finds [the] idea itself offensive or disagreeable. " 385
In his concurrence, Kennedy attests that, despite his and his fellow justices' very real
disgust for what Johnson did, protecting Johnson's flag burning as expressive conduct is
compelled by the Constitution. 386 Kennedy appears to write this opinion not for himself, but to
clarify to the public that the Justices are only too aware of what the outcome of this decision is.
To Kennedy, the cost of the jurisprudential goal of attempting to find and enforce the full and
necessary meaning of liberty sometimes leads to unsavory or distasteful results. But, all the
same, as appalling as the speech or expressive conduct may be, the Court is in some cases
compelled to protect it in light of the moral content of liberty. Kennedy states, ""The hard fact is
that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make them because they are right,
right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result. " 387
Here, what the American flag represents commits the Court to protecting Johnson's flag
burning as expressive conduct under the First Amendment. 388 The American flag is a constant
symbol of expressing beliefs and speech, beliefs in "law and peace and that freedom which
sustains the human spirit."389 Kennedy somberly continues, "the case here today forces
recognition of the costs to which those beliefs commit us."390 As perverse as it may sound, the
very flag which Johnson burned protects his freedom to burn it. Accordingly, the Court had no
choice but to affirm the holding of the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals.
B. Hill v. Colorado: protecting political speech post-Casey (dissenting opinion# 2)
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the Court upheld against a First Amendment challenge a criminal statute

prohibiting any person from knowingly approaching another person within eight feet of a health
care facility to provide the other with leaflets to engage in oral protest, education, or counseling,
without the other's consent. Petitioners stated that, prior to the statute's enactment, they had
enaged in "sidewalk counseling" on public walkways and sidewalks within 100 feet of facilities
where abortions were performed. 392 In an opinion delivered by Justice Stevens, the majority held
that the statute was a permissible content-neutral and viewpoint-neutral restriction on the time,
place, and manner of speech. 393 The law was narrowly tailored to further substantial, legitimate
government interests.
Dissenting, Kennedy finds that the majority's position conflicts with "more than a half
century of well-established First Amendment principles" and the essence of Casey. 394
. Kennedy's discussion of free speech in Hill is palpably molded by his substantive views on
abortion, attempting to find a balance between the constitutionality of abortion legislation and
the larger conception of free speech under the First Amendment. 395 Kennedy uses rhetoric and
oft-criticized paternalistic language typical of his abortion decisions to discuss the importance of
social and moral debate on abortion, the psychology of women who consider abortion, and the
potential for women who receive an abortion to suffer post-abortion regret. 396
Kennedy disdainfully declares, "[f]or the first time, the Court approves a law which bars
v·/ Private Citizens from passing a message, in a peaceful manner and on a profound moral issue,

to a fellow Citizens on a public sidewalk. " 397 To Kennedy, such a position in not in keeping with

391
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the expansive right of free speech and the liberty interests attendant with that right. Since Casey
prevents "pleas to the government to outlaw abortion" from having effect, opponents of abortion
must seek to "convince their fellow Citizens of the moral imperative of their cause. " 398
Colorado's law plainly prevents opponents from voicing such concerns where it is most
important, "the time and place where the act is about to occur," and to whom it is most
important, those near the health facility who are about to receive the procedure. 399 He continues,
"we learn today that Citizens have a right to avoid unpopular speech in a public forum, a position
that flies in the face of the First and Fourteenth Amendment"400
Kennedy's analysis reveals that the statute is neither content nor viewpoint-neutral. First,
Kennedy finds the statute to be content-based, as it restricts speech on particular topics. 401 The
law, as written, applies only to a special class of locations: "entrances to buildings with health
care facilities. ,,4°2 Kennedy declares, "we would close our eyes to reality were we to deny that
'oral protest, education, or counseling' outside the entrances to medical facilities concern a
narrow range of topics-indeed, one topic in particular." 403 By restricting speech in locations
where the prohibited discourse occurs, the law is content-based. 404 Kennedy quips, "clever
content-based restrictions are no less offensive than censoring on the basis of content. 405 Second,
the statute is not viewpoint-neutral. The law's purpose and design are to very cleverly "restrict
speakers on one side of the debate: those who protest abortions.',4° 6 Kennedy concludes:

398

ld. at 787-788.
I d. at 788.
400
ld. at 771. See also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963) ("The Fourteenth Amendment does not
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permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views.")
/d. at 767.
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"To say that one Citizen{ can approach another to ask the time or the weather
forecast or the direction to Main street, but not to initiate discussion on one of the
most basic moral and political issues in all of contemporary discourse ... is an
astonishing view of the First Amendment" 407
Additionally, Kennedy's dissent in Hill is noteworthy for its paternalistic language and
idea that women suffer post-abortion regret. Emphasizing his rhetoric in Casey that an abortion
decision must be "cautious and mature," Kennedy discusses the "profound difference" a leaflet
can have on a woman's decisionmaking process. 408 He characterizes the woman considering
abortion as "young" and "uninformed," and that abortion protestors are merely asking her to
"understand and contemplate the nature of the life she carries within her."409 By providing a
woman seeking an abortion with less information, it is more likely that she will come to regret
such decision than if more information had been provided to her. 410 In a decision that has
consequences for both the woman and society, others can and should use their liberty to inform
others through peaceful protest.
C. International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee: expanding the public forum
(concurring opinion # 2)
In Int'l Society for Krishna Consciousness, 411 the International Society for Krishna
Consciousness ("ISKCON"), a nonprofit religious corporation, challenged a New York Port
Authority restriction banning the distribution of literature and solicitation of contributions in

?'--.

airport terminals. ISKCON members perform sankirtan, a ritual w~t~Jeto public places,
disseminate religious literature, and solicit funds to support the religion. 412 ISKCON sued for
declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the ban deprived its members of their First

407
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.Amendment rights. 413 Analyzing the restriction under "traditional public forum" doctrine, the
district court held that airport terminals were akin to public streets, and no argument had been
evidenced that the ban was narrowly tailored to support a compelling state interest. 414
Accordingly, the district court granted ISKCON summary judgment. 415 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the ban on solicitation was reasonable, but the ban on distribution was

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 6-3 majority, upholds the Port Authorities'
restrictions. 417 As an initial matter, Rehnquist describes the "forum based" approach for
assessing regulations that government places on the use of its property. 418 In the first category of
public property, regulations of speech on traditional public forums, government property that has
"traditionally been available for public expression," is subject to the highest scrutiny.

419

Such

regulations are<t_~nly if they are "narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state
interest." 420 In the second category, public property that is a "designated public forum," property
that the State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public, is subject to the same
highest scrutiny as traditional public forums. 421 The third category is for nonpublic forums,
constituting all remaining public property. 422 Regulations ofnonpublic forums need only be
reasonable, and will be upheld as long as the regulation is not an effort to "suppress the speaker's
activity due to disagreement with the speaker's view."423

413
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Rehnquist concludes that precedent and history foreclose the possibility of airport
terminals as a public fora. 424 A public forum must be made by "intentionally opening
nontraditional forum for public discourse. 425 No such effort has been made with airport
./..--..........

terminals. Further, given how recently modem air terminals hav;t{~rose,jhey hardly qualify as
,..-"..";-;··"t•· .... ::.~...-;.";<'

•

"immemorially" being held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity.

426

In

fact, the tradition of airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have historically been
made available for speech activity. 427 ISKCON-style solicitation has only begun occurring in
airport terminals in recent years. As such, airport terminals are only nonpublic forums.
As nonpublic forums, restrictions on speech in airport terminals need only satisfy
reasonableness. 428 Rehnquist holds that this standard is met, as the regulation serves the airport's
legitimate interest in assuring its travelers are not unduly interfered with by undesired
solicitation. 429
In his concurring opinion, Kennedy uses his expansive theory of free speech to enlarge
the concept of public forums in order to better promote and protect the full and necessary
meaning of liberty through diversity of expression. 430 While concurring in the majority's
judgment, Kennedy objects to the majority's analysis. 431 Kennedy holds that airport terminals
are public forums and that speech in those places is entitled to the highest scrutiny, but the
challenged regulation is content-neutral and narrowly tailored to further a legitimate state
interest. 432
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Kennedy finds the majority's approach contrary to the public forum doctrine's underlying
purposes. 433 For Kennedy, the public forum doctrine recognizes the "limits of the government's
control over speech activities on property [that is] suitable for free expression."434 It stands for
the constitutional recognition that the government cannot impose silence on a free people, giving
effect to the First Amendment's command to protect speech from government interference.

435

At

the heart of our jurisprudence, Kennedy states, lies the principle that the liberties protected by the
Assembly, Speech, and Press Clauses of the First Amendment protect the rights of free Citizens
to gather and speak with one another in public places. 436
Kennedy's concept of the public forum doctrine would "accord public forum status to
other forms of property, regardless of their ancient or contemporary origins and whether or not
they fit within a narrow historic tradition."437 He rejects the majority's formulation, which
incorrectly predicates the decision to confer public forum status on a property on the
government's defined purpose for that property. 438 Such a concept of the public forum theory
misunderstands the liberty interests justifying the theory, and prevents the Court from protecting
the moral content of the liberties at issue. Under Kennedy's test, to determine whether public
property is a public forum, the court must determine:
"If the objective physical characteristics of the property at issue and the actual
public access and uses that have been permitted by government indicate that
expressive activity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses, the
property is a public forum. " 439
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Applying Kennedy's public forum test, it becomes "evident" that airport terminals are

°

public forums. 44 First, the district court's findings show that airports share physical similarities
with public streets, a universally accepted public forum. 441 Second, airport terminals are open to
the public without restriction. 442 Lastly, given adequate time, place and manner regulations,
expressive activity is very compatible with the uses of major airports. 443 By applying Kennedy's
test, the Court is better able to adapt the public forum theory to recognize new social realities
which serve the same practical purposes as public squares in times past.

444

Although he finds airport terminals to be public forums, like the majority, Kennedy
upholds the Port Authority's challenged regulations. 445 Since airport terminals are public
forums, any regulation of speech at airport terminals is valid only if it is narrowly tailored to
further a compelling state interest. 446 Kennedy explains that the bans are "either a reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction, or . .. a regulation directed at the nonspeech element of
expressive conduct. " 447 As Kennedy understands it, the solicitation ban is directed at curbing the
abusive practices attendant with in-person solicitation, particularly fraud and duress, and not at
any particular "message, idea, or form of speech."448 As such, the regulation is a content-neutral
rule that serves a significant government interest, and thus not violative of the First Amendment.
D. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission: protecting corporate political expression
(majority opinion# 6)
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the Court addressed governmental regulation of corporate political

speech. In January 2008, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, made a movie named

"Hillary: The Movie" ("Hillary"), a 90 minute political documentary about then-Senator and
potential Democratic Party presidential candidate Hillary Clinton ("Clinton"). 450 To promote the
film, Citizens United produced two 10-second ads and one 30-second ad on the movie, each of
which included a short, "pejorative" statement about Senator Clinton, followed by the name of
the movie and its Website address. 451 While the movie was released in theaters and on DVD,
Citizens United sought to make the movie available via video-on-demand within 30 days of the
2008 primary elections. 452 They were, however, concerned that Hillary and the ads promoting

Hillary would subject them to civil and criminal penalties, as they might be covered by federal
laws banning corporate-funded independent expenditures expressly advocating the defeat of a
candidate and electioneering communication within 30 days of a primary. 453
Citizens United filed suit against the Federal Elections Commission ("FEC") seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that (1) 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) was unconstitutional as
applied to Hillary and its ads; and (2) the Bipartisan Campaign reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA") 454

§ 203 was unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and its ads. 455

456

The District Court denied

Citizens United's motion for preliminary injunction, and granted the FEC's motion for summary

449
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The district court held that Hillary and its ads were susceptible to "no other

interpretation" than informing the electorate that Clinton was "unfit for office and that viewers
should vote against her." 458
The federal laws in question are§ 2 U.S.C. 44l(b) and the BCRA of2002. Under§
441 (b), as the court describes it:

~A.
J!P.
~ -.• .)l.JL' \.

..,.,./"1 ~

\..1 vvv~

"[C]orporations and unions from using general treasury funds to make direct
contributions to candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate
the election or defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in ~onnection
certain qualified federal elections. " 459
The BCRA of 2002 § 203 amended § 441 (b) to further prohibit any "electioneering
communication." Electioneering communication is defined as: "any broadcast cable, or satellite
communication" that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office" and is made
within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election."460 Additionally, electioneering
communication must be "publically distributed."461 For potential Presidential nominee
candidates, publically distributed means the communication "can be received by 50,000 or more
persons in a State where a primary election ... is being held within 30 days."462
Writing for the majority, Kennedy held that the "government may not, under the First
Amendment, suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity,"
overruling the Court's decision in Austin and partially overruling its opinion in McConnell. 463
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Kennedy asserts, "the Government may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer
and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether."464
The Citizens United opinion represents a triumph for Kennedy, ratifying his expansive
position on corporate speech in prior cases which treats corporations like individuals. Kennedy
typically strikes most restrictions on campaign donations and campaign speech by individuals,
organizations, and parties, viewing such laws as content-based restrictions of free speech and
association. 465 In Austin, the Court ~rd~~held a law preventing corporations from spending
, .. "'"-.

general treasury funds to support candidates for office. 466 Kennedy held that the majority's
decision deprived Citizens of information necessary to a democracy based solely on the identity
of the speaker. 467 Similarly, in McConnell, Kennedy voted to invalidate most of the BCRA,
holding that the First Amendment guaranteed Citizens the right to judge for themselves the most
effective means for expressing political views and to decide for themselves which entities to trust
as reliable speakers. " 468
As an initial matter, Kennedy finds that Hillary was an "electioneering communication"
under the BCRA § 203 and§ 441(b). 469 Per electioneering communication's definition, the
video-on-demand showing of Hillary on cable television would be a cable communication that
referred a clearly identified candidate for Federal office and that was made within 30 days of a
primary election. 470 The video-on-demand system, with its 3.5 million subscribers, would make
it so the film was capable of being received by 50,000 persons or more, which the Court found to
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be sufficient to satisfy the definition, regardless of how many actually ordered the film. 471
Further, under § 441 (b), Hillary was functionally equivalent to express advocacy against electing
Senator Clinton. 472 A communication is functionally equivalent to express advocacy for or
against electing a candidate only if, objectively, it is susceptible to "no reasonable interpretation
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. " 473 Here, Hillary was
effectively a 90-minute "negative advertisement" urging viewers not to vote for Clinton. 474 Most
viewers of Hillary would likely find its import to be an "extended criticism of [Clinton's]
character and her fitness for the office of the Presidency." 475
Next, Kennedy expounds on how the First Amendment protects political speech. He
states, "the First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during
a campaign for political office. " 476 Laws which burden political speech are subject to strict
scrutiny, requiring the government to show that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and
is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 477 Nonetheless, any law which creates content-based
or viewpoint-based restrictions of speech is categorically prohibited under the First
Amendment. 478
Having established this background analysis, Kennedy discusses what these First
Amendment protections of free speech really mean for corporations. Through a line of precedent
ranging all the way back to 1952, the Court has recognized that First Amendment protections
extend to corporations. 479 Kennedy makes the import of these precedents clear: "political speech
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does not lose [its] First Amendment protection simply because its source is a corporation. " 480
Instead, under the First Amendment and the full and necessary meaning of liberty, political
speech is protected, regardless of its source. Whether political speech comes from a corporation
or an individual, the speech still contributes to the free flow of information in democratic
decisionmaking.

481

Kennedy's concept of corporate political speech ignores the corporate form,

treating the corporation as he would treat an individual. Thus, like an individual, the
corporation's political speech is then a protected expression of its intimate beliefs and cannot be
censored absent a compelling state interest. Accordingly, when a law restricts a corporation's
political speech based on its status as a corporate entity, the law is an impermissible viewpointbased restriction, impinging on the corporation's liberty just as it would impinge on the liberty of
a similarly placed individual.
Here,§ 44l(b) and BCRA § 203 violated Citizens United's First Amendment rights by
suppressing its political speech based solely on Citizens United's corporate identity. 482 § 441(b)
and BCRA § 203 's purpose and effect was to prevent corporations from presenting facts and
opinions to the public based on their status as corporate entities. 483 If the First Amendment's
proclamation against viewpoint-based restrictions is to mean anything, it must mean that political
speech cannot be given disparate treatment because it was made by a corporate speaker rather
than an individual. Like an individual, Citizens United's political speech was a protected
expression of its intimate beliefs, and the government did not state an interest sufficient to justify
the speech's censor. Further, in restricting corporate speech,§ 441(b) and BCRA § 203 impeded
the free flow of information to the public, impairing the ability of the electorate to make
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thoughtful, deliberate, and informed choices. Thus, in order to give effect to the moral content of
liberty, the Court must find that§ 44l(b) and§ BCRA § 203 are impermissible restrictions on
Citizens United's corporate political speech. 484
While the government could not suppress Citizens United's political speech, it could
regulate Citizens United's speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements. Disclaimer
and disclosure requirements "burden the ability to speak ... but do not prevent anyone from
speaking." 485 In this manner, disclaimer and disclosure requirements are similar to the structural
regulations to abortion that Kennedy discusses in Casey. Under the BCRA, televised
electioneering communications funded by anyone other than the candidate must include a
disclaimer identifying the person or entity responsible for the advertising's content. 486 Here,
Citizens United's three ads for Hillary were electioneering communications.

487

The ads

mentioned Clinton by name, were intended to be aired shortly before a primary, and contained
pejorative references to her candidacy. 488 The government could then validly require Citizens
United to disclose that it was responsible for the ad, burdening Citizens United's ability to speak
but not preventing it from speaking.

Part IX: Conclusion
Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence focuses on ensuring that liberty is given its full and
necessary meaning under the Constitution as we understand it. The Constitution has "spacious
phrases," with general concepts that have moral content. Judges have an obligation to define and
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enforce this moral content. In performing this duty, judges may look to traditional sources, such
as tradition and history, or non-traditional sources, such as emerging political awareness and
international law, to provide objective referents for liberty. In applying this jurisprudential
philosophy on a case-by-case basis, Kennedy has been unpredictable in result, but consistent in
substance. Over the last 25 years, this content-consistent "unpredictability" has allowed
Kennedy to consistently write in and for the majority, molding the Court's opinions to reflect his
careful, reasoned beliefs and shaping the course of United States jurisprudence for years to come.

